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Abstract
We discuss the identiﬁcation and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Follow-
ing Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice
model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all
of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games.
With appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates enter into payoffs and inﬂuence equilib-
rium selection, the model is identiﬁed with only weak parametric assumptions. Monte Carlo evidence
demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. As an application, we
study the strategic decision of ﬁrms in spatially-separated markets to establish a presence on the Internet.
1 Afﬁliations: Bajari- Duke University Department of Economics and NBER, Hong and Ryan- Duke University Department of Eco-
nomics. We would like to thank seminar participants and Victor Aguirregabiria, Lanier Benkard, Jeremy Fox, Stephanie Houghton, John
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tional Science Foundation grants to Bajari and Hong.
11 Introduction.
In this paper, we study the identiﬁcation and estimation of static, discrete games of complete information.
These games generalize standard discrete choice models to allow utility to also depend on the actions of
other players. Examples of discrete games studied in the literature include Vuong and Bjorn (1984), Bres-
nahan and Reiss (1990,1991), Berry (1992), Seim (2001), Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2002), Mazzeo
(2002), Tamer (2002), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Berry, Ostrovsky and
Pakes (2003), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Manuszak and Cohen (2004), Sweeting (2004) and
Bajari and Krainer (2004).
The literature has considered both discrete games of complete and incomplete information. In incom-
plete information games the random preference shocks are private information, while in complete informa-
tion games they are common knowledge. Games of incomplete information can often be estimated using
a straightforward, two-step approach. (See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Berry, Ostrovsky and Pakes
(2003), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) and Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003).) Games of com-
plete information have proved much more difﬁcult to estimate. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
existing method that can be applied to discrete games with an arbitrary number of players and strategies.
Also, little is known about conditions under which discrete games are identiﬁed beyond the case of certain
entry games.2
2 There have been three approaches for solving these problems in practice. First, Tamer (2002) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2003)
propose bounds estimators for certain entrygames. A secondapproach is toexploit the structure of a speciﬁc class of games, such as
2In this paper, we study identiﬁcation and estimation of discrete games allowing for both multiple and
mixed strategy equilibria. We propose a simulation-based estimator for discrete games of complete infor-
mation. The model primitives include the latent utilities and an equilibrium selection mechanism which
determines the probability that a particular equilibrium to the game is played. Using these primitives, we
deﬁne a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator. We exploit recent algorithms that compute all of
the equilibria to discrete games which are included in the publicly available software package Gambit (see
McKelvy and McLennan (1996)). Our estimators are computationally efﬁcient and can be programmed
easily using Gambit and a standard optimization toolbox. We also showthat the models we study are identi-
ﬁed under fairly weak exclusion restrictions on the latent utilities and the equilibrium selection mechanism.
We provide some Monte Carlo evidence that our estimator works well even with moderately size samples.
Finally, we provide an application of our estimator. We study the strategic decision of small businesses to
go online by establishing a web page.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, our estimator can be applied to games
with a ﬂexibly speciﬁed structure of players and strategies. Previous methods exploited the structure of
speciﬁctypesofgames(e.g. entry games)inordertomakeestimationfeasible. Arbitrarilylargegamesmay
not be computationally feasible using our approach, due to the burden of computing all of the equilibria.
However, our approach allows us to estimate a more general set of games than previous methods. The
algorithms that we propose use new numerical techniques that generate two computational savings. First,
they are parallel and the most computationally intensive steps can be run on separate processors. Second,
entry games, in order to make point estimation feasible. See, for example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,1991) and Berry (1992).
Finally, some researchers directly parameterize the equilibrium selection process. Imrohoroglu (1993) estimates a money demand
model following Sargent and Wallace (1987), who show, under a number of restrictions, how to uniquely index the continuum
of equilibria with a ﬁnite vector of parameters. This strategy is also used in related contexts by Moro (2003), Ackerberg and
Gowrisankaran (2002), and Sweeting (2004).
3it is not necessary to recompute the equilibria to the games within the estimation procedure.
The second contribution is that we allow for both pure and mixed strategy equilibria. To the best of our
knowledge, all previous studies ignore the mixed strategy equilibria to discrete games. Considering mixed
strategy equilibria is important for two reasons. First, mixed strategy equilibria are a generic feature of
discrete games, and some games have no equilibria in pure strategies. If an estimator does not allow for
mixed strategies, the econometric model will be ill-deﬁned since it will not yield any prediction for this set
of games. Second, if mixed strategies are empirically important, which our application suggests they are,
then any estimator which does not admit their existence will be biased.
A third contribution is that we formally model the equilibrium selection process. Most previous papers
estimate the utility parameters but not the equilibrium selection mechanism. (See Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990,1991), Seim (2001), Mazzeo (2002), Tamer (2002), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003), Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2002), Berry, Ostrovsky and Pakes (2003), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Manuszak and
Cohen (2004), and Bajari and Krainer (2004).) Games typically generate multiple equilibria and theory
provides little guidance on which equilibrium is most plausible. It is not possible to simulate a game
without specifying, implicitly or explicitly, a model of equilibrium selection. Our paper therefore allows
us to consider counterfactual simulations that are not possible using other approaches.
F o u r t h ,w ed e r i v en e w ,s u f ﬁcient conditions for identiﬁcation. Previous work, such as Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990,1991), establishes that without restrictions on the game, it is not possible to identify utilities
from the observed actions. We present two sets of sufﬁcient conditions for identiﬁcation. First, if some
variable inﬂuences equilibrium selection but can be excluded from the utilities, then identiﬁcation is possi-
ble. Second, the model is identiﬁed if there are covariates that 1) shift the utility of an individual player, but
4are excluded from the utilities of other players and 2) these covariates are excluded from the equilibrium
selection mechanism. We discuss some examples of exclusion restrictions that might be found in applica-
tions. Our identiﬁcation results are established under weak parametric assumptions. While our estimation
approach is parametric, these results suggest that the identiﬁcation does not hinge on ad hoc functional form
restrictions. In moderate sample sizes, however, a parametric method provides a more feasible estimation
approach.
Our identiﬁcation strategy is closely related to approaches found in treatment effect and sample selection
models. The probability that a particular equilibrium is played is analogous to the “selection equation” and
the equation that determines utility to the “treatment equation”. In sample selection models, it is well
known that identiﬁcation under weak functional form assumptions often requires an exclusion restriction
(see Heckman (1990)). Exclusion restrictions are required to identify models that are much simpler than
ours. It necessarily follows that equally, or even more, stringent assumptions will be required in our more
complicated models.
The identiﬁcation results discussed in this paper can be extended to other games. For instance, Bajari
and Krainer (2004) use similar identiﬁcation arguments in a discrete game with incomplete information.
Also, the methods we propose could be useful for identifying peer effects. A “peer effect” implies that
agents have an incentive to act in accordance with norm behavior. If we assume that people are rational
economic actors, then the presence of a peer effect implies that a game is being played. We believe that our
identiﬁcation results shed some new light on these problems.
As an application of our estimator, we study the decision by small businesses to create a presence on
the Internet by posting a web page. The speciﬁc industry we study is golf courses in the Carolinas. Many
5golfers learn about the characteristics of a course (e.g. price, difﬁculty and location) by browsing the web.
Since there are only a handful of golf courses operating in most markets, the decision to create a web
page is naturally modeled as a game. Golf courses are representative of many small businesses. They are
primarily owner-operated small businesses that function in geographically separated markets. This industry
is an attractive case study of an important segment of the Internet.
Our application allows us to learn whether the adoption decisions of other ﬁrms are strategic substitutes
(lower the payoffs from adoption) or strategic complements (raise the payoffs from adoption). Also, our
estimation allows us to infer what types of equilibria are most likely to be played. In particular, our results
suggest that mixed strategy and efﬁcient equilibria are more likely in the data.
2 The Model.
The model is a simultaneous move game of complete information (normal form game). There are i =
1,...,N players, each with a ﬁnite set of actions Ai. Deﬁne A = ×iAi and let a =( a1,...,a N) denote a
generic element of A.P l a y e r i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility is a map ui : A → R,w h e r eR
is the real line. Let πi denote a mixed strategy over Ai. A Nash equilibrium is a vector π =( π1,...,πN)
such that each agent’s mixed strategy is a best response.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,1991), assume that the vNM utility of player i can be written as:
ui(a,x,θ1,ε i)=fi(x,a;θ1)+εi(a). (1)
We will sometimes abuse notation and write ui(a) instead of ui(a,x,θ1,ε i). I ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) ,i’s vNM
utility from action a, ui(a), is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst is a function fi(x,a;θ1) which depends on a,
the vector of actions taken by all of the players, the covariates x, and parameters θ1. The second is εi(a),
6a random preference shock. Note that the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of actions a, not
just the actions taken by player i. In much of the literature, it is assumed that the stochastic shocks are only
a function of player i’s own actions. The framework that we propose allows for more general preference
shocks. The εi(a) a r ea s s u m e dt ob ei . i . d .w i t had e n s i t yg(εi(a)|θ2) across i, a and observations in the
data. In principal, the i.i.d. assumption can be weakened. We could easily modify our estimator to allow
the εi(a) to only depend on the actions of i or to drop the independence assumption.3 We discuss the
independence assumption in more detail in our section on identiﬁcation.
The term εi(a) reﬂects information about utility that is common knowledge to the players, but not
observed by the econometrician. In games where there are a small number of players who know each other
well, they will observe important information about each other that is not observed to the econometrician.
The εi(a) captures this information. Under these circumstances, the assumption of perfect information
would be more reasonable approximation than private information.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Berry, Ostrovsky and Pakes (2003), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2003), and Sweeting (2004) assume that εi(a) is private information. The private information assumption
is appropriate if what player i knows about player j’s payoffs can be completely captured by fj. We note,
however, that private information games also can generate multiple equilibria (see McKelvy and Palfrey
(1995), Brock and Durlauf (2001,2003), and Sweeting (2004)). If one wishes to use private information
games to predict counterfactual outcomes, one will also need to account for the multiplicity of equilibria.
We are currently exploring this extension.4
3 If εi(a) has full support, then the probability that any game u is drawn will be positive. Therefore, the support of the likelihood
function is A for all parameter values and covariates. If εi(a) only depends on i’s actions, ai, the likelihood may not have
full support, A. This may lead to a severe speciﬁcation problem since the model could predict that some events may have
zero probability.
4 An intermediate but unexplored case is when there are both commonly observed and private shocks to payoffs. For instance,
7Let ui =( ui(a))a∈A denote the vector of utilities for player i and let u =( u1,...,u N). Given that there
may be more than one equilibrium for a particular u,l e tE(u) denote the set of Nash equilibrium. We now
introduce a mechanism for how a particular equilibrium is selected in the data. We let λ(π;E(u),β) denote
the probability that a particular π ∈ E(u) is selected, where β is a vector of parameters. In order for λ to




Theorists have suggested that an equilibrium may be more likely to be played if:
1. The equilibrium satisﬁes a particular reﬁnement (e.g. trembling-hand perfection).
2. The equilibrium is in pure strategies.
3. The equilibrium is risk dominant.
The speciﬁcs of a particular application might also suggest factors which favor some equilibria. For in-
stance, Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2003) suggest an equilibrium could be more likely if it
maximizes industry proﬁts or the proﬁts of the largest incumbent ﬁrm. Given u and E(u) we could create
dummy variables for whether a given equilibrium, π ∈ E(u) satisﬁes any of these criteria. Let y(π,u)
denote a vector of variables that we generate in this fashion. For instance,
εi(a)=ηi(a)+ζi(a) where ηi(a) is commonly observed by the players, but not the econometrician, and ζi(a) is private
information. This would generate a private information game with unoberved heterogeneity.
8y1(π,u)=
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π0∈E(u) exp(β · y(π0,u))
(3)
Note that in (3) the sum runs over the distinct elements of the equilibrium set π0 ∈ E(u). For each π0,w e
calculate the vector y(π,u)=( y1(π,u),y 2(π,u),y 3(π,u)) as in (2). Then we evaluate the standard logit
formula where β weights the probability that a particular type of equilibrium is selected. The example
above is meant to be a simple illustration of what a selection mechanism might look like in practice. It is
easy to generalize λ to allow for a less restrictive functional form and a richer set of variables y(π,u).
Computing the set E(u), all of the equilibrium to a normal form game, is a well studied problem. McK-
elvy and McLennan (1996) survey the available algorithms in detail. The free, publicly available software
package, Gambit, has routines that can be used to compute the set E(u) using these methods.5 Finding all
of the equilibria toa game is not a polynomial time computable problem. However, the available algorithms
are fairly efﬁcient at computing E(u) for games of moderate size. Readers interested in the details of the
5 G a m b i tc a nb ed o w n l o a d e do nt h ew e bf r o m http://econweb.tamu.edu/gambit/.
9algorithms are referred to McKelvy and McLennan (1996). In the next sections, we shall take the ability to
compute E(u) as given.
2.1 Examples of Discrete Games.
The model that we propose is quite general and could be applied to many discrete games considered in the
literature. We discuss three examples. The ﬁrst example is static entry games (see Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990,1991), Berry (1992), Tamer (2002), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003), and Manuszak and Cohen (2004)).
In applications of entry games, the economist observes a cross section of markets. The players in the game
are a ﬁnite set of potential entrants. In each market, the potential entrants simultaneously choose whether
to enter. Let ai =1denote the decision to enter the market and ai =0denote the decision not to enter the
market. In applications, the function fi takes a form such as:
fi =
½θ1 · x + δ
X
j6=i
1{aj =1 } if ai =1
0 if ai =0
(4)
In equation (4), the mean utility from not entering is set equal to zero.6 The covariates x are variables
which inﬂuence the proﬁtability of entering a market. These might include the number of consumers in
the market, average income and market speciﬁc cost indicators. The term δ measures the inﬂuence of j’s
choice on i’s entry decision. If proﬁts decrease from having another ﬁrm enter the market then δ<0. The
εi(a) capture shocks to the proﬁtability of entry that are commonly observed by all ﬁrms in the market, but
which are unobserved to the econometrician.
A second example is network effects, as in Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2002). They consider the
decision by banks in spatially separated markets to adopt the Automated Clearing House (ACH) payment
6 We formally discuss this normalization in our section on identiﬁcation.
10system. The players are the existing banks in some market. Let ai =1denote a decision to adopt ACH
and ai =0denote non-adoption. A priori, network effects are likely since if one bank in the market adopts
ACH, this should raise the beneﬁts to another bank of also adopting the system. A simple model of network
effects might take the form:
fi =
½θ1 · xi + δ
X
j6=i
1{aj =1 }·cj · ci if ai =1
0 if ai =0
(5)
In equation (5), xi denotes some factors which inﬂuence the costs and beneﬁts to adoption by ﬁrm i.F o r
instance, i might have large corporate or government agencies as customers who require access to ACH.
The variables in xi therefore might include characteristics of the customer base. The term ci is the current
number of clients of bank i.I f δ>0,t h et e r mδ
X
j6=i
1{aj =1 }·cj · ci indicates that the marginal beneﬁts
to adopting are larger 1) as the number of clients of bank i,c i increases and 2) as the number of clients of
each adopting bank j increases. Since proﬁts depend on the number of other banks that have adopted, we
say that a network effect is present. The term εi(a) captures beneﬁts to adoption observed by the banks but
unobserved by the economist.
A third example is peer effects (see Manski (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001,2003)). A peer effect
connotes a situation in which there is a desire to conform to the norm. Consider the decision by a high
school student of whether to take calculus during his senior year. The players in the game are students in
a particular grade. Let ai =1denote a decision to take calculus and ai =0to take an easier math course
(e.g., algebra). The utility of student i is:
fi =
½θ1 · xi + δ
X
j6=i
1{aj =1 }·tj if ai =1
0 if ai =0
(6)
In equation (6), the covariates xi could include terms that shift the incentives to take calculus. For instance,
11if i’s parents have a college degree, they might encourage calculus more strongly. The term ti denotes the
score of student i on a standardized achievement test. The term δ
X
j6=i
1{aj =1 }·tj models the peer effect.
Here, i’s decision depends on the average test score of other students who take calculus.7
The modeling framework we propose could be applied beyond these three examples. In principal, the
framework above could be used to model any discrete choice where 1) the decisions of agents are inter-
dependent, 2) decisions are made simultaneously and 3) there is complete information. If the number of
players or actions is very large, our estimator may not be computationally feasible. However, computation-
ally lighter estimators can be formed by assuming that the εi(a) are private information. Our identiﬁcation
results can be extended to these models in a straightforward way. (See Bajari and Krainer (2004) for a
discussion.)
3 Estimation.
Next, we propose a computationally efﬁcient MSM estimator for θ and β.L e t P(a|x,θ,β) denote the


















In equation (7), we compute P(a|x,θ,β) as follows. Given a realization of random preference shocks,
ε =( ε1,...,ε N), we use equation (1) to compute the utilities, which we denote as u(a,x,θ,ε) to emphasize
the dependence of the vNM utilities on the parameters, covariates and preference shocks. This determines
7 Games with very large numbers of peers might be computationally infeasible. However, our analysis offers insight into the
identiﬁcation of peer effects. Computationally lighter estimators can be formed by assuming that the εi(a) are private information.
See Brock and Durlauf (2001,2003) for example.
12the set of equilibria E(u(a,x,θ,ε)). Since this is generically a ﬁnite set, we sum over the equilibrium π ∈ E




that a is observed given π.
Following a suggestion by Ackerberg (2003), we change the variable of integration to u in order to
reduce the computational burden of simulating (7). Let h(u|θ,x) denote the density for the utility vector
u, conditional on θ and x. In many models, this is trivial to compute. For instance, suppose that the
preference shocks εi(a) are i.i.d. normal with density φ(·|µ,σ), with mean µ =0and standard deviation σ.






φ(ui(a) − fi(x,a;θ1)|0,σ) (8)





































In (10), we have modiﬁed the integral by adding the “importance density” q(u|x). In importance sampling,




N ),s=1 ,...,Sof random utilities from q(u|x). We






















Under standard regularity conditions, b P(a|x,θ,β) will be a unbiased estimator of P(a|x,θ,β). An im-
portance density q that matches h closely will reduce the variance of b P. Choosing an importance density
carefully is critical in practice. In our Monte Carlo and application sections, we discuss this problem in
detail.
3.1 The Estimator
The econometrician observes a sequence (at,x t) of actions and covariates, t =1 ,...,T. Equation (11) can
be used to form a maximum simulated likelihood estimator (MSL) for these observations. The simulated








where b P(a|x,θ,β) is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 1 ) .
As is well known, MSL is biased for any ﬁxed number of simulations. In order to obtain
√
T consistent
estimates, one needs increase the number of draws S so that S √
T →∞ .8
Alternatively, one can estimate the parameters using MSM. An advantage of MSM is it generates an
unbiased and consistent estimator for a ﬁxed value of S. To form the MSM estimator, enumerate the
elements of A from k =1 ,...,#A. Note that, because the probabilities of all of the elements of a ∈ A
must sum to one, one of these probabilities will be linearly dependent on the others, so there are effectively
8 InpracticewehavefoundthatMSLcanbeusefulforﬁndingstartingvaluesforMSM. Inourexperience, thelikelihoodfunction
is more concave around the maximum than in the MSM estimator.
14#A − 1 conditional moments. Let wk (x) be a vector of weight functions, with dimension larger than
the number of parameters, for each k and let 1(at = k) denote the indicator function that the tth vector of
actions is equal to k. The function P (k|x,θ,β) denotes the probability that the observed vector of actions
is k given x and the parameters θ and β. This is probability is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 7 ) . F o re a c hk,
E [1(at = k) − P (k|x,θ,β)]wk (x)=0 .







[1(at = k) − P (k|xt,θ,β)]wk (xt).
In practice, P (k|xt,θ,β) is evaluated by simulation using the importance sampler (11). For each xt,w e
draw a vector of S simulations u
(s)
t , s =1 ,...,Sfrom the importance density q(u|x). We assume that the
simulation draws u
(s)
t are independent over both t and s, and are independent of all xt’s. The moment









1(at = k) − b P (k|xt,θ,β)
i
wk (xt).




=a r gm i n
(θ,β)
mT (θ,β)
0 × WT × mT (θ,β). (12)
The asymptotic theory for estimating discrete choice models using MSL and MSM are well developed. See
McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989) or Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) for a detailed discussion.
3.2 Discussion.
An important insight in Ackerberg (2003) is that the problem of simulating (11) can be broken into three
steps.
151. Draw a large set of random games from the importance density q(u(s)|x).
2. Compute the set of equilibria, E(u(s)), from all games using Gambit or by using the algorithms de-
scribed in McKelvy and McLennan (1996).
3. Evaluate the sum (11).
In an MSM estimator, it is necessary to evaluate expressions such as (11) a large number of times.
However, once the equilibrium sets E(u(s)) have been precomputed, it is not necessary to repeat steps 1
a n d2w h e ne v a l u a t i n g( 11). To see this, note ﬁrst that u(s) does not depend on θ and β. Therefore the sets
are independent of the model parameters. The parameter β only enters in the function λ(π;E(u(s)),β).
As in (3), changing the value of β only involves changing the parameters that weight the characteristics of
the equilibrium. The parameters θ only enter into h(u|θ,x). Changing the values of θ will typically only
involve evaluating a density such as (8) at new values.
In practice, we “precompute” the equilibrium sets E(u(s)) and the minimize the simple, parametric func-
tion (12). The step of precomputing the equilibrium sets, E(u(s)), is naturally parallel. If the economist
has access to separate processors, he can send a subset of the games to each processor. In practice, com-
puting the equilibrium is the most burdensome step of the computation. The computational time required
to estimate the model is therefore roughly proportional to the inverse of the number of processors that the
economist can exploit.
An appropriate choice of an importance density can improve the performance of the MSM estimator
considerably. In our application, we found our importance density by ﬁrst estimating the game assuming
that the preference shocks in (1) are private information.9 For each value of xt the economist then simulates
9 This estimator can be performed in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the economist ﬂexibly estimates the choice probabilities
P(a|x) using standard methods. In the second stage, the economist assumes that these estimated choice probabilities represent the
agent’s equilibrium expectations. These choice probabilities are then substituted into the utility function. The logic of this
estimatorissimilartoAguirregabiriaandMira(2002),Berry, OstrovskyandPakes(2003), PesendorferandSchmidt-Dengler(2003)
and Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2004). Bajari and Krainer (2004) present a simple, static example of how to use these estimators.
16the private information version of the model S times at the estimated parameter values. This generates T ·S
pseudorandom values of the latent utilities.
4M o n t e C a r l o .
The followingMonte Carloillustrates the use of the estimator and demonstrates that, at least in our example,
it performs well in small samples. Consider a game of three players who must decide whether or not to enter
a single market. The ﬁrms have two actions, ai =0if they do not enter and ai =1if they do. The payoffs
from entering the market are given by:
ui(ai =1 )=θ1 − θ2(
X
j6=i
1(aj =1 ) )+θ3x1 + θ4x2 + εi(a), (13)
where1(·)istheindicatorfunction. Thepayoffsconsistofaconstantbeneﬁtofentry, θ1, apayoffassociated
with the number of other ﬁrms in the market10, θ2, two market covariate shifters, and an action-speciﬁc
error term. We interpret the two market-level covariates as population and average income, respectively. It
is important to note that the error term is different for every proﬁle of actions, as this is necessary to generate
the full range of strategies in equilibrium.11
The payoff for staying out of the market is simply:
ui(ai =0 )=εi(a). (14)
The εi(a) are drawn from a standard normal distribution. The vector of market covariates are drawn inde-
pendently from a uniform U[0,10] distribution.
The payoff structure generates games with many equilibria, so it is necessary to specify a process of
10 This parameter could be generically positive or negative, say for a network externality or competition penalty, respectively.
11 Restricting the error term to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc instead of action-speciﬁc generates dependence across the ﬁrm’s payoffs. In
this case many strategies become strictly dominated for any draw of  , ruling out some types of equilibria.






where MIXEDi is a dummy variable indicating if πi is a mixed strategy equilibrium. This allows us to
model whether or not mixed strategy equilibria are more likely to be played than pure strategy equilibria.
Within the sets of pure and mixed strategies each strategy has an equal probability of being selected.
To perform the Monte Carlo, we created a large pool of games using the payoff structure described
above, solved for their sets of equilibria in Gambit, and simulated an outcome for each game. For each
run of the estimator, we drew a new data set from the pool of games and outcomes before running the
estimation. The importance sampler games were also drawn from a pool of games generated with the same
payoff structure as the observations. Following Ackerberg, we set the initial guess in the denominator of the
importance sampler at the truth. We use an equal number of importance games and observations. The true
parameters (θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4,β1) are (5, 1.5, 1.0, -1.0, 1.0). With these parameters the game can be thought of
as the decision of three ﬁrms of whether or not to enter a market with a low-quality good. Firms prefer to
have fewer competitors. Demand increases with population but decreases with average income. We set the
equilibrium shifter to be positive to emphasize the ability of the estimator to deal outcomes generated by a
mixed strategy. We ran the estimator 100 times on data sets of 25, 50, and 100 observations. The results are
s h o w ni nT a b l e1 .
The results are illuminating. The estimator performs well for even very small samples (N =2 5 ).
The decrease in the size of the conﬁdence intervals is rapid as the number of observations increases for
all parameters, especially for the equilibrium shifter. Interestingly, the equilibrium shifter is estimated as
precisely as the utility parameters, despite the extra layer of uncertainty in its speciﬁcation. Part of the
18intuition to explain this that the set of games generated by the true parameter vector are rich in multiple
equilibria and mixed strategies. Each observation has additional structural requirements embedded in it
that each of the parameters must satisfy. So even though the effect of the equilibrium selection shifter is
indirect, it must satisfy a number of restrictions imposed by the game theory. This reinforces the idea that
the restrictions of even a basic game like this one are substantial enough to allow the precise estimation of
indirect parameters in the selection mechanism.
There is one caveat to our procedure that researchers have to address in practice. In the Monte Carlos,
we knew the true parameters of the game, and we able to generate importance games using these. With
real data, of course, these parameters are initially unknown. The importance sampler can generate biased
parameterestimatesifgivenpoorinitialguesses, soitisnecessarytoderivestartingparametersfromanother
source. We demonstrate this in our application by using a related game of private information.
5 Identiﬁcation.
The estimation strategy we proposed above is parametric which is appropriate when sample sizes are small
or there are many covariates.12 Even if parametric methods are used, an estimation approach is more
appealing if identiﬁcation does not hinge on functional form assumptions. Therefore, in this section, we
consider the nonparametric identiﬁcation of our model.
5.1 Identifying Assumptions from Discrete Choice.
To begin with, we impose some common identifying assumptions used in the discrete choice literature. The
model presented in Section 2 is a generalization of standard random utility models. Therefore, identifying
assumptions required in these models will also be required here.
12 We are currently pursuing nonparametric extensions to our estimation strategy.
19The ﬁrst identifying assumption we make is:
A1. For every i and a−i ∈ A−i,w el e tfi(ai,a −i,x)=0for some chosen ai ∈ Ai and for all
a−i ∈ A−i.
The rationale for A1 is similar to the argument that we can normalize the mean utility from the outside
good equal to zero in a standard discrete choice model.13
A second assumption that we will make is:
A2. For every i and for every a, εi(a) are distributed i.i.d. standard normal.
W ec o u l dc h a n g eA 2t oa l l o wεi(a) to be any known joint parametric distribution. However, for expo-
sitional clarity, we shall assume that it has a standard normal distribution. Even in the simplest discrete
choice models, it is not possible to identify both fi (a,x) and the joint distribution of the εi (a) nonparamet-
rically. Consider a standard binary choice model where the dependent variable is 1 if the index u(x)+ε is
greater than zero, i.e.
y =1 ( u(x)+ε>0) (16)
All the population information about this model is contained in the conditional probability P(y =1 |x), the
probability that the dependent variable is equal to one given the covariates x. I ft h ec d fo fε is G, then (16)
implies that:
P(y =1 |x)=G(u(x)), (17)
13 Let π and π
0 be two arbitrary mixed strategies. In order to show that this assumption is without loss of generality, we
must verify that it does not change i’s ranking of π and π
0.
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Hence assumption A1 does not change the ranking of pure strategies. Analogous arguments demonstrate that this normalization
does not change the preference ordering over mixed strategies.
20Obviously, only the composition of G(u(x)) can be identiﬁed, and it is necessary to make parametric
assumptions on one part (e.g. G or u) in order to identify the other part. For instance, if G is the standard
normal cdf, we could perfectly rationalize the observed moments (17) by setting u(x) to the inverse cdf
evaluated at P(y =1 |x). Therefore, we will assume that the error terms are normally distributed.
We are alsomakingthe assumption that theε(a)’s are independentlydistributed. This assumptionis also
required for the identiﬁcation of single agent models if the function fi(a,x) is nonparametrically speciﬁed.
For example, consider a simple single agent multinomial choice model with three options. Denote the
possible choices as a ∈ {1,2,3}.F o r a =1 ,2 let
ui(a,x,εi)=fi(a,x)+εi(a).
Also, the mean utility for the third option is normalized identically equal to 0:
ui(3,x,ε i) ≡ εi(3).
In the population, only two conditional probability functions are available to identify the model:
P (a =1 |x) and P (a =3 |x).
The last observable probability
P (a =2 |x),
is linearly dependent on the other two probabilities and does not help identiﬁcation.
Holding x ﬁxed, since there are only two moments, the unknowns fi (1,x) and fi (2,x) already exhaust
the degrees of freedom available in the population. We can only hope to identify fi (1,x) and fi (2,x) by
assuming that the joint distribution of the error terms is known. There are no additional degrees of freedom
to identify the correlation structure between the error terms.
21A multinomial probit model or a nested logit model allows one to estimate the correlation coefﬁcients
between εi(1), εi(2) and εi(3). However, this comes at the cost of assuming a parametric functional form
for the deterministic utility component fi(a,x).
5.2 Two by two games.
In what follows, it will be useful to consider simple examples in order to understand the main concepts.
Therefore, we begin by analyzing the structure of equilibrium in a two player, two strategy game. To




We make the normalization A1 by setting a1 = T and a2 = L. The resulting payoff matrix will take the
form:
Payoff Matrix for Two-Player Game
L R
T (ε1(TL),ε 2(TL)) (ε1(TR),f 2(TR,x)+ε2(TR))
B (f1(BL,x)+ε1(BL),ε 2(BL)) (f1(BR,x)+ε1(BR),f 2(BR,x)+ε2(BR))
To analyze the structure of this game, we begin by observing that the set of equilibria E(u) can be
characterized as follows:
Lemma 1. (2 by 2 Equilibrium). With probability one, the set of equilibrium is either unique or has
three elements. If it has three elements (i) One equilibrium is in mixed strategies and (ii) In the two
pure strategy equilibrium, no player plays the same strategy in both equilibria.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proof to the lemma above establishes that there are exactly two cases of possible multiplicity. If
there are three equilibria, the possible sets of equilibria, E(u) are of the form:
221. {(T,L),(B,R), a mixed strategy equilibrium}
2. {(T,R),(B,L), a mixed strategy equilibrium}.
Next, we illustrate our approach for ﬂexibly modeling λ, the equilibrium selection mechanism. We
begin by making the following assumption about λ which we will maintain for the rest of the identiﬁcation
section:
A3. λ does not depend on the stochastic preference shocks ε.
This assumption is analogous to “selection based on observables” assumption in treatment effect and
sample selection models. In these models, it is commonly assumed that the error terms in the treatment
equation is independent of the error term in the selection equation. The implication of this assumption is
that the treatment status is exogenous conditional on the observables and that the outcomes of the treated
and untreated group can be compared conditional on observing the x’s.
We will also require λ to have the following type of invariance. Consider two distinct sets of equilibrium
E(u) and E(u0). Suppose that the supports of the equilibria in E(u) and E(u0) coincide in the following
sense:
(i) For every π ∈ E(u) there is a π0 ∈ E(u0) with the same support.
(ii) For every π0 ∈ E(u0) there is a π ∈ E(u) with the same support.
Then, we will assume that λ(π;x,E(u)) = λ(π0;x,E(u0)) if π and π0 have the same support. In words,
this means that the measure λ only depends on the support of the elements in E(u), not the magnitude of the
mixing probabilities. In the context of the two-player game, this would mean that if the equilibrium set was
{(T,L),(B,R), a mixed strategy equilibrium}, λ would always give the same probability to (T,L), (B,R)
and the mixed strategy equilibrium conditional on x. If the mixing probabilities changed, this would not
change the probability assigned to the mixed strategies. We will maintain these assumptions for the rest of
23the identiﬁcation section and formalize this condition in the assumption below.
A4. Given x, λ only depends only on the support of the elements in E(u).
If we make assumption A3 and A4, then exactly four probabilities are required to parameterize the
equilibrium selection process. We label these functions as
λ1 (x),...,λ 4 (x).
where:
1. If the equilibrium set is {(T,L),(B,R), a mixed strategy equilibrium}, select (T,L) with probability
λ1 (x), (B,R)withprobabilityλ2 (x)andthemixedstrategyequilibriumwithprobability1−λ1 (x)−
λ2 (x).
2. If the equilibrium set is {(T,R),(B,L), a mixed strategy equilibrium}, select (T,R) with probability
λ3 (x), (B,L)withprobabilityλ4 (x) andthemixedstrategyequilibriumwithprobability1−λ3 (x)−
λ4 (x).
Note that since there are two possible sets of equilibria (when there is multiplicity), we do not use λ3 (x)
and λ4 (x) when the equilibrium set is {(T,L),(B,R), a mixed strategy equilibrium}. Similarly, we do
not use λ1 (x) and λ2 (x) if the equilibrium set is {(T,R),(B,L), a mixed strategy equilibrium}. When
the equilibrium is unique, the selection mechanism has no “bite” since only one outcome is possible.
Assumptions A3 and A4 allows us to characterize λ as a ﬁnite dimensional vector of parameters condi-
tional on x. In our framework, the number of equilibria is ﬁnite with probability one because the ε’s are
drawn from an atomless distribution. Therefore, there are ﬁnitely many possibilities for which strategies
can have positive support in equilibrium. In our two by two game, this allows us to characterize the se-
lection mechanism with 4 parameters conditional on x. In more general games, by similar logic, one can
always characterize the equilibrium selection mechanism using a ﬁnite number of parameters conditional
on x. As we will show below, this simpliﬁes our identiﬁcation problem.
24Lemma 2. Given A1-A4, λ can be characterized by a ﬁnite dimensional vector of parameters holding
x ﬁxed.
Given the results of Lemma 2, for the rest of this section we shall associate λ(x) with a ﬁnite vector
of real numbers.
5.3 Identiﬁcation: Deﬁnitions and Preliminaries.
A model is said to be identiﬁed if the model primitives can be recovered given the probability distributions
the economist can observe. In a normal form game, the available population probabilities are P(a|x) for
a ∈ A, the probability distribution of the observed actions conditional on the covariates x. The primitives
we wish to identify are f(a,x) and λ(x). That is, we wish to learn the vector of mean utilities f(a,x)=
(fi(a,x)) and λ(x) without making parametric assumptions about these objects.
Our approach can be criticized as not being completely “nonparametric”. Assumption A2 implies that
we have made normality and independence assumptions about the error terms. We note, however, it is
not possible to identify simpler single agent discrete choice models without this assumption. Assumptions
A3 and A4 are also restrictions on λ(x). However, it does permit considerably ﬂexibility. To the best of
our knowledge, we establish the only results in the literature that allow for identiﬁcation of the selection
mechanism under weak functional form assumptions. At a minimum, we hope that this will be a useful
starting point for further work.
We can generalize equation (7)b yw r i t i n gP(a|x) in a way that does not hinge on the speciﬁc parametric

















In equation (18), we write the vNM utilities as u(f,ε) to remind ourselves that they are a sum of the mean
25utilities f(a,x) and the shocks ε. By Lemma 2, holding x ﬁxed we can view (18) as a ﬁnite number
of equations that depend on the ﬁnite number of parameters, f(a,x) and λ(x). Denote this system as
P(a|x)=H(f(x),λ(x)) where H is the map implicitly deﬁned by (18). When writing H, assume that
we drop one choice probability for each player. Since choice probabilities add up to one, this introduces a
linear dependence between the rows of this system. We will let DHf,λ(x) denote the Jacobian formed by
differentiating H with respect to the parameter vectors f(x) and λ(x).























In what follows, we shall often invoke the following assumption:
A5. The map H is continuously differentiable. Also suppose that the n1 by n2 Jacobian matrix DHf,λ
has rank n2.
AssumptionA5impliesthatforoursystemofimplicitequations(18)wecanchecklocalidentiﬁcationby
comparing the number of moments, P(a|x), to the number of free parameters (f(x),λ(x)). If the number
of moments is greater than the number of parameters, then the implicit function theorem implies that the
parameters are locally identiﬁed. While we can directly verify assumption A4 for certain games (e.g. a 2
by 2 game), we cannot do so for general games. At a minimum, this would require us to characterize the
different sets of all equilibrium that can be reached, analogously to lemma 1. This is not feasible in games
with many players and strategies.
5.4 Identiﬁcation: Negative Results.
The ﬁrst result we establish is that even if the selection mechanism λ i sk n o w n ,i nat w ob yt w og a m e ,t h e
four deterministic utility parameters cannot be nonparametrically identiﬁed.
26Theorem 1 In a game with two players and two strategies, if we make assumptions A1-A5, the determin-
istic utility components
f1 (BL,x),f 1 (BR,x),f 2 (TR,x),f 2 (BR,x)
are not identiﬁed from the distribution of P(a|x) even if the selection mechanism
λ1 (x),...,λ 4 (x)
is known.
Proof: To begin with, consider the identiﬁcation problem holding a given realization of x ﬁxed. Since
there are two players with two strategies, the econometrician observes four conditional moments,
P(TL|x),P (TR|x),P(BL|x), and P (BR|x),
Since the probability of the actions must sum to one, there are effectively three moments that the econo-
metrician observes. This leaves us with 4 utility parameters,
f1 (BL,x),f 1 (BR,x),f 2 (TR,x),f 2 (BR,x)
to identify. Clearly, for a given realization of x we are not identiﬁed. Q.E.D.
The result above can easily be generalized to generic games. Conditional on x, the number of mean
utility parameters is greater than the number of moments available to the econometrician.
Theorem 2 In a game with more than two players and at least two strategies per player, if we make
assumptions A1-A5, the deterministic utility parameters fi(a,x) are not identiﬁed from the distribution of
P(a|x), even if the selection mechanism λ(·) is known.
Proof: Consider a game with N players and #Ai strategies for player i. Holding x ﬁxed, the total number










27This is equal to the cardinality of the number of strategies, times the number of players, minus the normal-
izations allowed by assumption A1. The number of moments that the economist can observe, conditional




If each player has at least two strategies and if there are at least 2 players in the game, then for each given x
the difference between the number of utility parameters, fi, to estimate and the number of available moment
conditions is bounded from below by
µ






Clearly, we will be unable to identify the utility parameters of the model. Q.E.D.
6 Exclusion Restrictions.
The results of the previous section are not surprising in light of the analysis of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)
and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) who demonstrate failures of identiﬁcation in discrete games.
As we noted in the introduction, the structure of our models is not unlike treatment effect and sample
selection models. The latent utilities f seem analogous to the treatment equation and λ to the selection
equation. It is well known that these simpler models cannot be identiﬁed without exclusion restrictions.
That is, we must search for variables that inﬂuence one equation, but not the other. In what follows, we
demonstrate that a similar approach is possible in games. We ﬁrst consider exclusion restrictions where
some variable inﬂuences λ, but not f. Second, we consider the case where there are shifters of f that do
not inﬂuence λ.
286.1 Identiﬁcation Exclusion restrictions in equilibrium selection
We begin by supposing that there are some variables z that inﬂuence λ but which can be excluded from f.
That is,
A6. λ is a function of x and z,w h e r ez can be excluded from fi for all i.
Before we formally consider the problem of identiﬁcation, it is useful to ask what variables might be
plausible z’s in some applications. One potential source of such variables is regulation which is a com-
monly exploited source of exogeneity in treatment effect models. Consider the following simple example.
Choosing whether to drive on the left or the right side of the road can be modeled as a coordination game.
There are naturally 3 equilibrium to this game. Driving on the left, driving on the right, and the mixed
strategy equilibrium. In practice, the side of the road that we drive on is strictly regulated; however, it
differs across geography. For instance, one drives on the left in England and the right in the United States.
Regulation inﬂuences the choice of equilibrium in many problems. Frequently, government or industry
groups will encourage market participants to coordinate on a particular equilibrium, such as a particular
standard for a technology with multiple standards.
A more speciﬁc example can be found in Bajari and Krainer (2004). The authors model the determina-
tion of analyst recommendations (e.g. strong buy, buy, hold, sell, etc...) for high technology stocks. Their
choice of an average recommendation is fundamentally indeterminate as is the assignment of any type of
grade. A grade of any sort is usually judged by making a comparison to a relevant set of peers. Just as
college professors benchmark their grading practices against colleagues, research analysts have an incentive
to benchmark their recommendations against the practices of their peers.
Since this is a coordination game, there can be multiple equilibria. Beginning in June of 2001, the
29State Attorney General of New York, Elliot Spitzer, began to question business practices in this industry.
Spitzer criticized investment banks for issuing a large fraction of strong buy and buy recommendations, but
few hold or sell recommendations. The authors argue that this intervention by the regulator encouraged
the industry to focus on an equilibrium where more “sell” and “hold” recommendations are issued. They
divide time into pre and post “Spitzer” eras and view this time dummy as an instrument z.A l s o , t h e y
interact this dummy with the number of analysts engaged in investment banking to construct additional
instruments. The logic is that stocks covered by a disproportionate share of analysts from investment banks
have incentives to coordinate on an equilibrium with lower grades.
A second set of variables that could enter z include previous plays of the game or behavior in surround-
ing markets. In many economic problems, the selection of equilibrium could be history dependent. For
instance, college professors, when determining how to grade, will base their expectations about which equi-
librium to play based on grades submitted in previous years. Also, professors in the economics department
may benchmark their grades against more general grading practices in the university.
In Bajari and Krainer (2004), the authors argue that there could be some history dependence in industry
practices so that lagged behavior might inﬂuence the equilibrium that is selected. Therefore, the authors
use regulation and lagged behavior as excluded variables that inﬂuence the equilibrium selection process
but not the current payoffs. Constructing measures of lagged behavior and behavior in adjacent markets
can be done in many applications. Whether or not these variables are valid exclusion restrictions, however,
will be application speciﬁc.
In addition to A6, we also need to assume that:
A7. The covariates, x, can be partitioned into
x =( xλ,x u)
30such that λ(x,z) depends only on xλ and not xu:
λ(x,z)=λ(xλ,z).
That is, there must be some payoff relevant variables xu that are also excluded from the equilibrium
selection mechanism. The plausibility of A7 must be judged on a case by case basis. In some cases,
such as the example of submitting stock recommendations, there seemed to be industry wide norms for
gradingstocksthat transcendedindividualstocks. Forinstance, bydeﬁnition, arecommendationof “market
underperform” is issued for a fairly small fraction of stocks. This is despite the fact that, by deﬁnition,
1/2 of the stocks must underperform the market mode! One interpretation of the hesitance to issue low
recommendations is that this represents a norm among stock analysts. If the norm transcends the game
played for an individual stock, then A7 might be a plausible approximation to what occurs in the data. This
would imply that some payoff relevant covariates, xu, can be excluded from equilibrium selection.
Theorem 3 In the two by two game, suppose that A1-A7 are satisﬁed. Also suppose that (xλ,x u,z) takes
on a discrete number of values and#xu > 3 and #z>3. Then the mean utilities fi(a,x) and the selection
parameters λ(xλ,z) are locally identiﬁed.
Proof: The number of moments generated by observable population conditional outcome probabilities,
P(a|xλ,x u,z) is
3 × (#xλ) × (#xu) × (#z), (19)
Note that, in this equation, we multiply by 3 because the probabilities of the various actions must sum to
one. The total number of parameters needed to characterize both the utility functions and the equilibrium
selection probabilities is
4 × (#xλ) × (#xu)+4× (#xλ) × (#z). (20)
31Alternatively, we can think for each each given xλ,t h e r ea r e
3 × (#xu) × (#z), (21)
conditional outcome probabilities and there are
4 × (#xu)+4× (#z), (22)
parameters to estimate. It is clear that as long as #xu > 3 and #z>3,
3 × (#xu) × (#z) > 4 × (#xu)+4× (#z) (23)
and the model is locally identiﬁed by the implicit function theorem. Q.E.D.
These results will extend beyond the 2 by 2 game. The key to the proof is that the number of moments
depends on theproduct of (#xu)×(#z)inequation(21)whilethenumberofparameters is alinearfunction
of #xu and #z in (22).
Theorem 4 In a general N player game, suppose that A1-A7 are satisﬁed. Also suppose that (xλ,x u,z)
takes on a discrete number of values. If #xu and #z are sufﬁciently large, the model is locally identiﬁed.
Proof. In a more general game, the number of parameters required to characterize the selection mechanism
will be speciﬁc to the number of players and the number of actions. However, holding xλ and z ﬁxed,
by Lemma 2, it must be possible to characterize λ with a ﬁnite dimensional parameter vector. Since this
vector depends on the supports of the elements in E(u), it is possible to create a bound on the size of this
vector that is independent of xλ and z.L e t #E denote this number. Holding xu ﬁxed, the number of vNM























The number of moments is proportional to
(#A − 1) × (#xu) × (#z).
The number of moments grows at a rate involving the product of (#xu) × (#z) while the number of
parameters is a linear combination of these terms. For sufﬁciently large #xu and #z, the number of
moments is greater than the number of parameters. Hence, by the implicit function theorem and A5, the
model is identiﬁed. Q.E.D.
In Theorem 4, we required the variables to live in a discrete set. However, if the variables are all con-
tinuous, identiﬁcation follows from the arguments above trivially. While the requirements of this theorem
are quite stringent, this is a very powerful result. If the economist is willing to assume that the exclusion
restrictions in A6-A7 are valid, then all of the primitive parameters can be recovered under fairly weak
parametric assumptions.
6.2 Identiﬁcation using exclusions in payoffs.
A second approach to establishing identiﬁcation is to search for covariates that shift the utility of agent i,
but which do not enter as arguments into uj (j 6= i)o rλ. In some applications, such covariates might be
easier to ﬁnd than variables z which shift the entire equilibrium as in the previous section.
A8. For each agent i, there exists some covariate, xi that enters the utility of agent i, but not the utility
of other agents. That is, i’s utility can be written as fi(a,x,xi). Furthermore, xi can be excluded
from λ.
33Assumption A8 implies that there are agent i speciﬁc utility shifters. In the Bajari and Krainer (2004)
example, this could include the amount of investment banking business done by the ﬁrm or other brokerage-
speciﬁc covariates. Thus, A8 would imply that the investment banking work done by Merrill Lynch does
not directly inﬂuence the utility of Goldman Sachs for issuing a particular recommendation. While this
assumption is unlikely to be perfectly satisﬁed, to a ﬁrst approximation it does seem reasonable. In the
information released by prosecutors, ﬁrms were accused of biasing reports to favor their own investment
banking clients. They were not alleged to bias their reports in favor of the clients of other ﬁrms.
Theorem 5 Supposethat A1-A5 andA8 hold. If #xi aresufﬁcientlylarge, the modelisnonparametrically
(locally) identiﬁed.
Proof: The proof follows similarly to the previous section. Hold x ﬁxed. Consider a large, but ﬁnite
number of values of xi equal to K for each agent. Consider the all the distinct vectors of the form x =
(x1,...,x N) that can be formed. The number will be equal to KN. Consider the moments generated by
these KN distinct covariates. The number of moments is equal to KN ·
X
i
(#Ai − 1). The number
of mean utility parameters is equal to
X
i
K (#Ai − 1)
Y
j6=i
#A plus the number of parameters required to
characterize λ (which is independent of the xi). Thus, the number of moments depends linearly on K but
the but the number of moments grows exponentially with K. By choosing sufﬁciently large values for K
the model is identiﬁed. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind the theorem above is quite simple. By shifting the individuals’ utilities one at a
time, it is possible to increase the number of moments at a faster rate than the number of parameters. Thus,
identiﬁcation of the model is possible. As in the model of the previous section, the theorem generalizes
trivially to the case of continuous covariates.
347A p p l i c a t i o n .
As an application of our estimator, we consider the decision by small businesses to create a web page on the
Internet. We follow recent work in empirical industrial organization by limiting the focus of our application
to a single industry. The particular industry we study is golf courses in the Carolinas. Golf courses are
typically owner-operated enterprises that to a ﬁrst approximation compete in spatially separated markets.
Also, many golfers will search for a course web page to learn about the price, course characteristics (slope,
length, etc.) and the course location. The largest businesses in the U.S. were early and widespread adopters
of the Internet. We would expect small businesses to be the marginal adopters. Golf courses, therefore,
are a case study of an interesting segment of the Web.
7.1 Background.
Robert Metcalfe, who founded 3Com and helped develop the Ethernet protocol, stated what has become
known as Metcalfe’s Law: the usefulness of a network increases in the square of the number of users.
The Law applies particularly well to information technologies, such as telephones, fax machines, and most
recently, the Internet. Network dynamics are characterized by initially low adoption rates that increase
dramatically once the network achieves a “critical mass” in the number of users.
The speed of this adoption varies by technology and cost, with progressively more complex tech-
nologies taking longer. The evolution of major communication media reﬂects this: radio was quickest,
followed by television, with the Internet taking the longest. The foundation of the Internet has been around
for decades, but it was only during the mid-1990’s that it became a cultural and economic phenomenon.
For instance, the value of retail goods sold online in 1990 was virtually zero. By 1998, it had reached $4.9
million; four years later it had increased by an order of magnitude to $44.2 million. This trend also holds
35true for manufacturing, wholesale goods, and service markets.
Like all products, network good markets are two-sided: there must be consumers of network goods,
but there also must be providers. Clearly the consumer side of the Internet has reached critical mass and
continues to grow and mature. The response to the Internet over the same time horizon by ﬁrms has been
varied, both across and within industries. From the consumer’s perspective, the Internet augments at least
two aspects of a ﬁrm’s operation: advertising and the delivery or procurement of goods. Almost every large
ﬁrm in the world now has an informational web site, while most retailers also have a full-ﬂedged electronic
storefront.
Adoption of Internet technologies to smaller ﬁrms and fringe markets has been slower and more
varied. Vacationing markets are a good example. There are literally thousands of possible destinations for
consumers to choose from. While every town with a beach could choose to advertise itself separately from
other towns, most do not do so. Instead, there are a number of web sites that aggregate information, utilizing
their local expertise to help potential customers select among the large number of choices. However, the
choice of whether to adopt an Internet web site or not has important strategic considerations. The number
of competitors that have adopted a web site can be important for several reasons. First, choosing not to
adopt while your competitors do can have negative demand consequences if consumers use web sites to
help decide where they want to vacation. Second, ﬁrms with no competitors on the web can also face a
negative supply-side network effect—consumers cannot ﬁnd enough information about beaches in the area
and will turn to other information outlets to help them decide.
For these reasons, it is important to model the decision of whether to adopt an Internet technology
as the outcome of a strategic game. Our estimator provides a natural way of estimating games of this type,
36where there are a relatively low number of ﬁrms in regional markets that are deciding on a discrete action.
We focus on the decision of golf courses in North Carolina and South Carolina to create and maintain their
own web sites. Golf is a popular recreational activity, and the Carolinas are a popular destination for people
looking for a golf-oriented vacation.
Some vacationersaregoingtodecide ontheirvacationitineraryafterconsultinganumberofgolﬁng
sources, including print guides, magazines, and the Internet. There are a large number of information
aggregators in the online golf market, since choosing among the hundreds of golf courses is daunting.
Every golf course in the Carolinas is covered in some form by one of these general golﬁng web sites.
Each course has a generic listing with location, course rating, par, yardage, slope, and price. In addition,
a number of golf courses have decided to create and maintain their own web sites. The purpose of these
web sites is largely informational since most sites do not allow you to buy time at the course. However,
the nature of the information is more speciﬁc and detailed than the information on the general golf web
sites. Typically the web site has information about the course’s history, its designer and layout, tee time
policies and other regulations, and attempts to make the golf course seem as attractive as possible. This
text is usually accompanied by ﬂattering photographs of the fairways and greens under optimal weather
conditions and lighting.
7.2 Data.
We construct a data set on the golf industry in North Carolina and South Carolina. We obtain the
location of every golf course in the two states. Where possible, we collect information on a number of
relevant covariates: course type (public, private, semi-private, resort, military), location, whether they have
a web site or not, number of holes, par, yardage, course rating, slope, weekday and weekend prices, local
37population, median rent, median house value, and median household income. The data were collected using
Internet golf guides to get course characteristics. Housing prices and income are from Census sources.
Good market deﬁnitions were critical given we model the decision to adopt a web site as the out-
come of a strategic game among local competitors. Yahoo! Yellow Pages has a useful feature which gives
distances between ﬁrms in the same category. We use this feature to deﬁne markets by chaining all courses
that are within 10 miles of any other course in the market. As a result, some courses within the market will
be further than 10 miles apart while others may be next to each other, but this deﬁnition produces a range
of market sizes which track geographic features and population centers fairly well. For tractability in the
estimation, we only consider markets with ﬁve or fewer golf courses.
Table 2 gives some summary statistics of the data set. The total number of golf courses is 261 and the
number of markets is 124. The typical golf course in our data set has a par of 68, is about 6,000 yards, and
has a weekend price of $27.26. The Carolinas offer a considerable variety to the golfer as can be seen in the
variation in course characteristics. Table 3 displays the rates of web site adoption broken down by market
size. In all of our market sizes, less than half of the ﬁrms choose to go online. While larger markets tend
to have a higher adoption rate, the pattern is far from linear.
7.3 Results.
In the model, ﬁrms are assumed to play a simultaneous move game of whether to create a web page with
other ﬁrms in the same local market. The decision to create a web page (or not) is denoted as ai =1
(ai =0 ). The utility of ﬁrm i for adopting the web page is assumed to be a linear function of the weekend
price, the number of competing ﬁrms in the market, the population of the market, the average home price,
and the average income. The mean utilityfor not adopting is normalized tozero. The weekend price of golf
38course i will be excluded from the adoption decision of other ﬁrms in the market. Theorem 5 demonstrates
that if we also exclude this variable from the selection mechanism, the model would be identiﬁed under
weak parametric assumptions.
We also parameterize the equilibrium selection rule. The equilibrium selection rule takes the form:
λ(e;E(u)) =








The term MIXED(e) is a dummy variable equal to one if the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The
term eeff −e is the difference between the efﬁcient equilibrium (in the sense of maximizing the sum of the
players’ utilities) less the sum of utilities in equilibrium e. Our model of equilibrium selection lets us ask
whether more efﬁcient equilibria to the game and pure strategy equilibria are more likely.
Good starting values are critical to the estimation procedure. To obtain these we use a two-step proce-
dure. Consider a related game where the error term is private information. In this setting, each ﬁrm has
expectations about the number of competitors it will face if it decides to enter. We model these expectations
by regressing the number of actual adopters in a market on that market’s characteristics. In the second step,
we use this predicted number of competitors, along with ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, in a probit model
of adoption choice. We then used the regression coefﬁcients from this model as our starting values. We
found that the constant, number of competitors, and price of a round of golf on the weekend were the only
statistically signiﬁcant parameters. See Bajari and Krainer (2004) for the details of this estimator.
Starting with these values, we estimated the full model on the model using markets with two ﬁrms.
This involved seeding the games from the importance density with the starting values from the ﬁrst stage
private information game, solving for their equilibria in Gambit, and then using these in the estimation
39procedure. The initial guess in the importance density, q(u|x), is very important for maintaining numeri-
cal stability in the optimization procedure. If the current values of the parameters are far from the initial
guess the optimization routine can behave pathologically. Also, the estimates are biased towards the starting
values if the truth is far from the initial guess. Therefore after each full estimation, we re-seeded the im-
portance density with the new parameters and re-solved the games in Gambit. After running the estimation
procedure again, we checked to see if the new estimates were substantially different than the starting val-
ues. We iterated the re-seeding procedure until convergence was achieved; typically, this took only two full
iterations of the estimation procedure. Once convergence was achieved for the small markets, we increased
t h es a m p l es i z et oi n c l u d em a r k e t sw i t hu pt oﬁve ﬁrms.
Once we had solved for the parameter estimates, we added market-level covariates and the equi-
librium selection parameters to the basic model. We added population, median house value, and median
house income to the utility speciﬁcation for each ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm makes the adoption decisions based
on the opportunity cost of doing so, these covariates should be interpreted as marginal effects on the payoff
of adopting a web site.
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation. The constant is negative, meaning there is a disincentive
toadoptawebsiteabsentallothereffects. Thiscapturesthefactthatadoptingawebsiteiscostlytotheﬁrm.
Adoption is driven in large measure by the difference in prices across ﬁrms. High prices are associated with
much higher rates of web site adoption. The price is almost certainly a proxy for the golf course’s quality
and a measure of how desirable the course is. Therefore it is intuitive that these ﬁrms may have the largest
beneﬁts from advertising their courses on a web site, as consumers are willing to travel further to play nicer
courses. Higher quality courses also have the largest incentives to differentiate themselves from average or
40poor quality courses.
There are signiﬁcant penalties associated with adopting a web site when your competition has also
done so. This indicates that the potential network beneﬁts from adopting with other producers are swamped
by the diminished market exposure associated with having to share the online market. The market level
demographic estimates indicate that they are not signiﬁcant determinants in the decision to adopt a web
site.14 It appears that price soaks up most of the information about quality that would be relevant to the
decision of whether to adopt or not.
The equilibrium selection parameters are particularly interesting. The coefﬁcient on the MIXED
dummy in the selection equation shifts the probability of selecting the set of mixed strategy equilibria over
the set of pure strategy equilibria. Mixed strategy equilibria are more likely to be played than pure strategy
equilibria, although the marginal effect is small.
The literature typically chooses to ignore the mixed strategy equilibria in empirical applications. Our
results suggest that this assumption may be problematic. Not only are the mixed strategy equilibria slightly
more likely, but there can also be a large number of these equilibria. For instance, in the ﬁve ﬁrm case, we
draw several games from the importance sampler with over 30 equilibria, the majority of which are either
partially or fully mixed. The unconditional probability of a mixed strategy using our estimated parameters
is 0.701 with a standard deviation of 0.2197. Also, the importance sampler did draw examples of games
that only equilibria in which at least one player mixed. An estimation method that did not allow for mixed
strategies would be undeﬁned in this case.15
14 The market-level covariates were normalized to lie in between 0 and 100.
15 For example, consider an entry game with 3 ﬁrms where payoffs are deﬁned as follows:{ "In, In, In" -5, -5, -5 }{ "In, In,
Out" 1, 1, 0 }{ "In, Out, In" 1, 0, 1 }{ "In, Out, Out" 7, 0, 2 }{ "Out, In, In" 0, 1, 1 }{ "Out, In, Out" 2, 1, 0 }{ "Out, Out, In" 0, 2, 1
} {" O u t ,O u t ,O u t "0 ,0 ,0} . I nt h i sg a m e ,t h e r ei sau n i q u em i x ed strategy equilibrium. The probabilities of playing In
forthethreeplayersare: 0.213495, 0.670985,and0.350388. Wehaveveriﬁedcomputationallythatthisequilibriumisgenericinthe
41The results also suggest that an efﬁc i e n te q u i l i b r i u mi sm o r el i k e l yt ob ep l a y e dt h a na ni n e f ﬁcient
equilibrium. We view this ﬁnding as particularly interesting. Unlike stylized models of perfect compe-
tition, it is not true in general that decentralized actions should lead to efﬁciency when there is strategic
behavior. Nevertheless, our estimates suggest that ﬁr m st e n dt or e a l i z em o r ee f ﬁcient conﬁgurations of
web adoption patterns.
We acknowledge that our model does not allow for dynamics which may be important for understanding
the incentives to adopt this technology. However, compared to previous applications of discrete games, the
assumption of static behavior is probably more plausible in our application. In entry games, the model is
static despite the fact that the data exhibits decade(s) old incumbents. In our application, most web pages
were established in the last 3 to 4 years. While dynamics may be present, they seem less problematic than
in entry games.
7.4 Model Simulations.
A powerful feature of our estimator is the ability to handle multiple equilibria, particularly those in mixed
strategies. Previous estimation techniques have used special features of the econometric problem to avoid
having to deal with the multiplicity of equilibria. For example, Berry, Ostrovsky, and Pakes emphasize this
point: “It is important to note that though our assumptions do not guarantee a unique equilibrium, they do
insure that there is only equilibrium that is consistent with a given data generating process.A s ar e s u l t ,
we will be able to use the data itself to ‘pick out’ the equilibrium that is played, and at least for large
enough samples, we will pick out the correct one.” One drawback of this type of approach is the inability to
researchers to simulate the model forward and perform counterfactual analysis, since the estimator provides
sense that the mixed strategy equilibrium persists for nearby payoffs. An estimator that did not accomodate mixed strategies
would be undeﬁned for this vector of utilities.
42no guidance about which equilibrium will be played under different economic conditions. On the other
hand, since we explicitly account for the equilibrium selection mechanism, this is something that we can
calculate with conﬁdence.
For example, it is interesting to gauge how close the expected utility of an observed outcome is to the
joint utility-maximizing equilibrium. To compute this distance, we form games with payoffs determined by
the observed covariates andtheparameters of theestimation. Weuse Gambit to solvefor all of the equilibria
of these games, and compute the expected payoff of each equilibrium. The expected surplus is simply the
difference between the expected payoff of the observed action and the most efﬁcient equilibrium.16 This
type of calculation is simply not possible without a equilibrium selection mechanism, since it requires
knowing the expected payoffs under all possible equilibria. Figure 1 graphs the distribution of observed
utility surplus, broken down by the size of the market. Table 1 shows summary statistics of the surplus
distribution.
An interesting feature of the data is that, for all market sizes, the distribution of surplus has a mass of
probability centered at zero. The distributions are negatively skewed. This is to be expected as we compare
the expected utility of one outcome against the maximum expected payoff of all possible equilibria. The
opposite is also possible, as sometimes the observed outcome is a fortuitous element of the most efﬁcient
equilibrium. The mass to the right of zero is clearly going to be less than that to the left, since at best the
most favorable market outcome can be one part of the efﬁcient equilibrium while poor outcomes can be part
of dominated equilibria. In fact, for the markets with 2 and 4 ﬁrms, no expected outcome does better than
the expected outcome of the most efﬁcient equilibrium.
Table 5 shows the distribution of the percentage difference between the expected utility of the observed
16 The expectations are relevant here since the ﬁrms’ payoffs are subject to unobserved shocks.
43outcome and of the maximum expected utility. There are generally two modes near 0 and -100, as outcomes
are close to the efﬁcient outcome or are far away from it. When the value is -100 it corresponds the case
where no ﬁrms decided to adopt, where the efﬁcient outcome has a positive payoff. Interestingly our results
suggest that in the three smaller markets there are a number of lost opportunities to adopting a website.
Only in the largest market do the observed outcomes tend to be close to efﬁcient on average. These results
are also summarized in ﬁgures 1 and 2.
8C o n c l u s i o n .
Estimating models that are consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior is an important empirical problem.
In this paper, we have developed algorithms that can be used to estimate both the utilities and the equi-
librium selection parameters for static, discrete games. Our algorithms, unlike previous research, can be
applied to general normal form games, not just speciﬁc examples such as entry games. The algorithms use
computationally efﬁcient methods and our Monte Carlo work suggests that they may work well even with
a moderate number of observations.
We also study the nonparametric identiﬁcation of these games. Previous researchers have proved neg-
ative results in the class of models we study. In general, these games are not identiﬁed. However, we
demonstrate that identiﬁcation is possible through the use of exclusion restrictions. Two types of exclusion
restrictions are sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation. First, if there are variables that inﬂuence equilibrium selection
but do not directly enter into payoffs. Second, if there are variables that: a) shift i’s utility but which do not
enter into the utility of other players and b) can be excluded from the equilibrium selection mechanism.
As an application of our methods, we studied the decision by ﬁr m st og oo n l i n eb yc r e a t i n gaw e b
page. Our data set was a cross section of many markets and there is no particular reason to assume that the
44same equilibrium was played in each market. The results suggested that web page adoption has a negative
effect on the decision to create a web page. Also, the data displays a tendency toward selecting efﬁcient
equilibrium. The application highlights the strengths of our approach. Five player games had upwards
of 30 equilibria and in some cases there were no pure strategy equilibrium. The estimation methods
we propose to the best of our knowledge are the only current approach capable of accommodating both
multiplicity and mixed strategy equilibria.
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4810 Appendix.
10.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
There are at most 4 pure strategy equilibrium. We note that, generically, there is at most one mixed
strategy equilibrium. This equilibrium can be represented as the solution to a system of two equations
and two unknowns (representing the mixing probabilities) and the solution to such a system is unique with
probability one. Therefore, an upper bound on the number of equilibrium is 5 for generic u.
Next, we demonstrate that the number of pure strategy equilibrium must generically be less than two,
given u. Suppose not. Note that for one player, some strategy has to be an element of two or more
equilibrium. Without loss of generality, let (T,L), (T,R) and (B,R) be three pure strategy equilibrium.
By the deﬁnition of equilibrium:
u2(T,L) ≥ u2(T,R)
u2(T,R) ≥ u2(T,L)
The ﬁrst inequality follows because (T,L) is an equilibrium and the second because (T,R) is an equilib-
rium. Therefore, u2(T,L)=u2(T,R). This event is not generic. Therefore, there are at most two pure
strategy equilibrium and generically the number of equilibrium is three. If the number is three, one of them
must be mixed, which establishes (i). Arguments analogous demonstrate (ii). Q.E.D.
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This ﬁgure shows the distribution of expected surplus conditional on the size of the market. The expected surplus is calculated
as the difference between the expected utility of the observed outcome and the expected utility of the most efﬁcient equilibrium.
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This ﬁgure shows the distribution of the percentage of expected maximum surplus conditional on the size of the market. The
distribution is calculated as the percent difference between the expected utility of the observed outcome and the expected utility of
the most efﬁcient equilibrium.
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Table 1: Monte Carlo Results. 
Parameter Mean  Median IQR  Confidence  Interval  Std.  Dev 
T=25         
θ1  5.0342 5.0404  0.21418 [4.5684,  5.5686]  0.26308 
θ2  1.4877 1.4675  0.23879 [1.0771,  1.9592]  0.26361 
θ3  1.1283 1.0394  0.19277 [0.72062,  1.9593] 0.36912 
θ4  -1.0711  -1.0244   0.04973 [-1.2794, -0.97999]  0.19687 
β 1.0330  0.99922  0.01356 [0.92224,  1.1125]  0.33465 
          
T=50         
θ1  5.0218 5.0288  0.08552 [4.6863,  5.3162]  0.20485 
θ2  1.4794 1.4752  0.16211 [1.1823,  1.8771]  0.21398 
θ3  1.0322 1.0176  0.06815 [0.82246,  1.3440] 0.19895 
θ4  -1.0293 -1.0116
  
0.02993 [1.0837, 0.98737]  0.08357 
β 1.0172  1.0000  0.00448 [0.95352,  1.0168]  0.23988 
          
T=100          
θ1  5.0323 5.0224  0.05724 [4.8738,  5.2040]  0.12690 
θ2  1.4938 1.4766  0.08945 [1.3246,  1.7082]  0.14590 
θ3  1.0253 1.0165  0.03221 [0.92628,  1.2529] 0.17947 
θ4  -1.0221 -1.0112  0.01746 [-1.0594,  -0.99170]  0.058417 
β 0.99637  1.0001  0.00100 [0.96680,  1.0083]  0.017842 
Monte Carlo results of the estimator on simulated data sets of N=25, 50, and 100. The estimation was 





Table 2: Summary Statistics for Golf Courses. 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Par  67.81   72.00   11.39 
Yardage 6091.60  6,456.00  1,208.81 
Course Rating  69.28   70.90   7.77 
Slope  121.94 121.50 7.61 
Weekday Price  22.93   20.00  14.58 
Weekend  Price  27.26 25.00 15.07 
Population 14,282.78  7544.50  18,509.33 
Median  Rent  324.18 311.04 82.20 
Median House Value  85,717.35  78,400.00  32,582.27 




Table 3: Website Adoption Rates for Golf Courses in Carolinas. 











Table 4: Parameter Estimates. 
Parameter Mean  Median  Confidence 
Interval 
Constant   -1.1830   -1.1511  [-1.5017,-1.1218] 
Competition Penalty   -6.1076   -6.1226  [-6.0331,-6.4116] 
Weekend Price   0.3365   0.3337  [0.3321, 0.3447] 
Population 0.0006  -0.0012  [-0.0207,0.0161] 
Median House Value   -0.0264   -0.0243  [-0.0766, 0.0065] 
Median House Income   -0.0878   -0.0525  [-0.2520,0.0128] 
Mixed Strategy Selection  0.1984  0.1841  [0.1841, 0.2459] 
Most Efficient Strategy 
Selection  









2 3 4 5 
Minimum    -15.33   -16.89   -26.02   -5.38 
1st  Quartile    -6.76   -6.79   -15.73    -3.7 
Mean   -4.56   -3.22   -10.23   -1.74 
Median    -4.58   -2.94   -7.84   -2.26 
3rd Quartile  -1.06  0.46  -4.74  0 
Maximum 0  7.2  0  3.68 
Number 
Observations 
32 20 10 8 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.83 5.98 8.67 2.89 
 
 